Selected Bits of The 2026 Baltic Threat Assessments: A "Greater Baltic" and a Self-Immolated Protester, Warning to Armenia
Plus Roger Waters, Oliver Stone & Gerhard Schröder!
It’s that time of year when intelligence services release their public reports and threat assessments. Latvia’s Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) published theirs two weeks ago, and the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service (VLA) presented its own just today.
I read them both.
They give a good overview of what to expect from Russia in 2026—not only in the Baltic area, but well beyond.
The Good News
A Russian military threat against the Baltic countries is not imminent, according to both reports. The Estonian report states that Russia has no intention of militarily attacking Estonia or any other NATO member state in the coming year and that the VLA is “likely to reach a similar assessment next year.”
The reason? Europe’s growing defense investments that “compel the Kremlin to calculate very carefully what, if anything, it can risk attempting.”
The Long-Term Warning
Latvia’s SAB warns that Russia’s perception of Latvia is becoming increasingly similar to the one it held of Ukraine before the war—depicting us as “Nazis.” While Russia does not pose a direct military threat to Latvia at the moment, a number of signs indicate potential long-term plans.
“Our information indicates that Russian officials believe the propaganda the regime has created and disseminated about Latvia. Although not a priority for Russia, the increasingly negative view of Latvia may result in more aggressive Russian decisions in the long term.”
The Latvians also warn of continued Russian sabotage operations against Western countries, alongside a readiness to carry out cyberattacks on industrial control systems running critical infrastructure.
The Term of the Year: BSM
The VLA writes of a new concept gaining traction inside the Kremlin: the Baltic–Scandinavian macro-region (BSM) (Балтийско-Скандинавский макрорегион).
The BSM concept is being pushed by a Kafkaesquely named body inside the Presidential Administration: the Directorate for Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC). We have written about the CBC extensively over the last few years—for example, here, here, and here.
Besides Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the macro-region includes Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and Poland. Welcome to the BSM, dear neighbours!
The BSM concept is not a genuine academic or environmental endeavor, but a geopolitical influence operation orchestrated by the Kremlin with heavy involvement from Russian intelligence services. A prime example is the Baltic Platform initiative, which my colleagues and I uncovered a few years ago.
The ultimate goal is to provide the Russian government with actionable plans to interfere in the domestic politics of Baltic Sea countries, undermine national security and energy policies, and use international platforms to accuse Baltic/Scandinavian states of human rights violations or religious persecution.
Peace Prize for Roger Waters?
One of the more entertaining sections of the VLA report reveals the “behind-the-curtains” drama of the Tolstoy International Peace Prize. This was created by Russian spy chief Sergey Naryshkin and Putin’s advisor (and recent “head negotiator”) Vladimir Medinsky as an alternative to the Nobel Peace Prize. (You can read our profile of Medinsky here).
“When the 2024 prize was being prepared, it became clear that finding a suitable Western nominee would be rather challenging. Several names proposed—such as Roger Waters, film director Oliver Stone, or former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder—were deemed respectable but potentially counterproductive by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Waters’s case, officials were uncertain whether he would agree to accept the award or travel to Moscow. As for Stone and Schröder, the ministry noted the “Russophobic predisposition” of their home countries and concluded that awarding them the prize would not resonate positively there from Moscow’s perspective.”
In the end, the Tolstoy Peace Prize was awarded to the African Union.
A Self-Immolated Protester
While the VLA doesn’t see an abrupt change coming in Russia or an anti-war opposition gaining a public voice, it did reveal a shocking example of protest that Russia has managed to keep “under the lid” until now.
According to the report, on the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression—at five o’clock in the morning on February 24, 2025—a man born in 1988 wrote “No to war” in the snow near a monument to a Russian soldier in Kaliningrad and set himself on fire in protest. The report did not reveal the man’s identity or his current condition.
GRU Chasing Western Equipment
I’m actually quite surprised by the amount of detailed information the VLA published this year. It isn’t just generalizations; it contains significant detailed data.
For example, they reveal how roughly a hundred GRU officers spend their working days handling product codes, price quotes, and logistics chains to procure technology for Russia’s military industry. The report identifies 10 GRU officers who operate through one specific cover company: Neptun Ko Ltd (ООО Нептун Ко Лтд).
A Huge Push in Drone Warfare
While the EU is pondering how to build its billion-euro “drone wall” and debating if it should be called a wall at all, Russia is pushing hard to implement unmanned systems units across all military branches.
The development of Russia’s unmanned capabilities is of major importance for NATO and Estonia for several reasons:
Supply: Russia’s defense industry and civilian sector are likely capable of supplying enough unmanned systems to equip new units.
Capabilities: The extensive adoption of these systems will likely enhance Russia’s intelligence, naval-strike, indirect-fire, and precision-strike capabilities.
Scale: In the event of conflict, the state must be prepared to fight an adversary using a massive number of unmanned systems at strategic, operational, and tactical levels—on land, in the air, and at sea—simultaneously across Estonia’s entire territory.
Russia is “expected to produce around 190 unmanned systems battalions.” In the Baltic Fleet, a regiment of unmanned naval strike vehicles has already been formed, along with a UAV regiment under the direct command of the Leningrad Military District. These units are currently being staffed and armed in our immediate vicinity.
Russia’s Main Target in 2026: Armenia
Perhaps the most interesting chapters in the VLA report concern Moldova and the South Caucasus. While Russia lost its expensive campaign to steer Moldova back into its sphere of control, the Kremlin “is almost sure to make another attempt to seize control of Moldova’s state institutions,” the report says.
At the same time, the most imminent risk for Russia is losing control over the South Caucasus. Analyzing the U.S.-led peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan—which include a framework for an American-controlled transit corridor—the VLA assesses that this could mark the beginning of Russia’s ejection from the entire region. This “loss” would be a traumatic event of historic proportions for the Kremlin.
Russia is highly likely to do everything in its power to derail the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty and the creation of the transit corridor named after President Donald Trump.
“Moscow’s best option for undermining President Trump’s initiative is to intervene in Armenia’s domestic politics. Russia will therefore almost certainly launch a major influence campaign against Armenia in 2026. This campaign will aim to interfere in Armenia’s parliamentary elections [this summer], remove Prime Minister Pashinyan from power, and install a government that appears nationalist but is, in substance, under Russia’s control.”
These are just some of the excerpts from the Baltic intelligence reports. If you’re interested in reading more, you can find the English versions here and here. Also, the Latvian counterintelligence agency (VDD) published their report just yesterday, but I haven’t had a chance to dive into that one yet.
Thank you, and until next time!



What stands out isn’t an imminent military move, but the consolidation of non-kinetic pressure.
The reports read like a pivot: deterrence holds at the border, so leverage shifts to influence ops, infrastructure vulnerability, and electoral interference with drones as the scalable military hedge.
The BSM label matters less as ideology than as an operational perimeter for these tools.
“The transit corridor named after President Donald Trump.” Whoever came up with this part of the plan seems to have figured out how to get the current US government on side. Ridiculous but pragmatic; I hope it works.